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摘 要 
此论文研究马来西亚 2000 到 2015 年首次公开募股 (IPO) 抑价现象的原
因。本人对比了两种 IPO 抑价的计算法：未调整的初始收益 （IPOU） 和市场
调整的初始收益（MIPOU）。IPOU 与 MIPOU 在多元回归分析结果是一致的。首先，
市场热点与两者是正相关，而公司的股份规模与声望高的承销商投资银行的关系
是负相关的。以马来西亚（大马）作为特别的研究课题，是因为 1976 年实行的
政策规定所有上市的公司预留 30% 的总发行股份给土著。然而，到了 2009 年
的 6 月，政府决定宽松政策因此把此预留股份已降至 12.5%。因此，为了探讨
此政策对 IPO 抑价的影响，多元回归分析在政策宽松前后的样本进行测试。而
宽松前的政策显示，IPOU 与 MIPOU 的结果仍是一致。公司的股份规模与它们是
负相关关系，而却与市场热点拥有正相关关系。然而政策宽松后，IPOU 与 MIPOU 
的结果却不一致。声望高的承销商投资银行与 IPOU 持有负相关关系，而公司年
龄与 MIPOU 却持有正相关关系。由此证明了，政策的变动导致了 IPO 抑价的原
因也随着时间点不同而不同。另外，它也造成了 IPOU 与 MIPOU 的结果不一致。 
 
关键词：IPO 抑价、土著政策、马来西亚债券市场 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of IPO underpricing in Malaysia stock market 
from 2000 to 2015. The regression results with the two IPO underpricing calculation 
methods: market-adjusted initial return of IPO (MIPOU) and unadjusted initial return 
of IPO (IPOU) were compared. It suggests that the IPOU and MIPOU results are 
consistent where positive correlation with hot market condition is shown, while 
negative correlation between both IPO initial return methods with offer size 
(LNOFFER) and prestigious underwriter (UNDERWTR) are reported. The stock 
market in Malaysia is unique because all listed companies are required to reserve 30% 
of the total issued shares to bumiputera (indigenous population) since 1976. However, 
the reserved shares have reduced to 12.5% in July 2009. Thus, to examine the effect 
of the policy towards the determinants of IPO underpricing, the sample was further 
divided into two subsamples: pre-implementation and post-implementation of the 
share reduction policy. During the pre-implementation period, it was found that the 
IPOU and MIPOU have negative relationship with LNOFFER and positive 
relationship with HOT. However, after the reduction of reserved shares to bumiputera 
was implemented, the determinants of IPOU and MIPOU are significantly different. 
UNDERWTR has negative relationship with IPOU, while company‟s age (AGE) is 
positively correlated with MIPOU. This implies that this regulation change has 
impacted the IPO underpricing determinants over time and also caused inconsistency 
between the regression results of IPOU and MIPOU.  
 
Keywords: IPO underpricing; Bumiputera Policy; Malaysia Stock Market 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
Going public is one of the equity financing, which refers to the sale of ownership 
interest to raise funds for business purposes. This grants the public equity capital 
access and may lower the company‟s cost of funding from operations and 
investments.  
 
Companies can go public by Initial Public Offerings (IPO) of shares to investors. IPO 
refers to the first sale of stock by a company to the public. It distinguishes from 
Season Equity Offering (SEO) in which the latter means new equity (shares) issued 
by an existing public traded company. Though going public has abovementioned 
benefits, the process of IPO issuance is costly. Comparing the 3 external capital 
raising methods: IPO, SEO and bond issuance with U.S corporation data from 1990 to 
1994, Lee, Lochhead, Ritter and Zhao (1996) concluded that the average direct costs 
associated with IPO such as: hiring investment banker, attorneys, accountants and 
underwriting fee is 11%, which was highest among other external capital raising 
methods.  
 
Indirect cost may occur in the case when IPO is underpriced. It happens when the 
offer price is lower than the first-day closing price and it becomes a cost to the firm 
because the stock is sold for less than its efficient price in the aftermarket. As the cost 
of IPO issuance is high, why do firms still go public? Taranto (2001) answered that 
managers are able to protect their positions through the use of options and stock 
grants. Options and stock grants are used to protect senior managers from any dilution 
to their equity position caused by underpricing of IPO. Furthermore, managers of 
firms earn more from underpricing on their options than they lose on their equity 
position (Loughran & Ritter, 2001).
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The early evidence of IPO underpricing was discovered by Ibbotson (1975) and Stoll 
and Curley (1970) in the early 1970s of the IPO in the United States. Ibbotson (1975) 
found an average initial performance of IPO of 11.4% using a sample in 1960s. On 
another hand, with IPO listing on 1975, 1959 and 1963, Stoll and Curley (1970) found 
an average underpricing of as high as 75%. From 1977 to 1982, the IPO was 
discounted for 16.3%, but has increased to 48.4% during the following 15 months 
period of 1980 to 1981 (Ritter, 1980). Ritter categorized the former as “cold issue” 
market while the latter as “hot issue” market. Ritter and Welch (2002) continued the 
study by covering 1980 to 2001 and discovered an average of 18.8% of positive return 
of IPO on their first trading day. The extent of underpricing varied across different 
sample periods employed. 
 
In South East Asia region, Malaysia IPO was largely discounted as reported by 
Dawson (1987) in which the average underpricing was 166.7% in 1978 and 114.6% in 
1983. Yong and Isa (2003) studied the IPO initial return between 1980 to 1998 
recorded that the average initial returns of IPO in Malaysia was 104.1% making it the 
second highest IPO underpricing after China as compared with 38 other countries as 
compiled by Loughran et. al (2006). A more recent study by Abdul Rahim and Yong 
(2010) showed an average initial return of 31.99 percent from 1999 to 2007.   
 
Explanation in regards to the underpricing have been documented, such as 
asymmetric information (Rock, 1982; Ritter, 2003; Chowdhry & Sherman, 1996a; 
Chowdhry & Sherman, 1996b; etc), institutional effect (Loughran et al.,1994; 
Sherman, 1996b; Alanazi & Al-Zoubi, 2015; Liu et al. 2014), ownership and control 
(Brennan & Franks, 1997; Ljungqvist, 2007; Rashid et al., 2014), industry (Kirkulak 
& Davis, 2005; Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995; Heerden & Alagidede, 2012), underwriter‟s 
reputation (Hoberg, 2003; Kirkulak & Davis, 2005; Loughran & Ritter, 2004; Chua, 
2014), hot markets (Ibbotson & Jaffe, 1975; Agathee et al., 2011; Ibbotson & Ritter, 
1995; Helwege &  Liang, 2004; Premti & Madura, 2013, etc).  
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1.1.1  Motivation of Research 
The study of Malaysian IPO underpricing has been extensive. Rahim et al. (2012) 
confirmed the existence of winner‟s curse. In terms of ownership and corporate 
structure, Hussin (2005) finds that the owner participation‟s ratio is negatively related 
to IPO underpricing and fraction of directors‟ shares subject to liquidity restrictions is 
positively related to IPO underpricing; Yatim (2011) found that dual leadership 
structure and board reputation is positively related with IPO underpricing, while 
directors who hold outside board membership with other firms has negative effect to 
explain the underpricing. Chong and Puah (2009) reported that the economic 
condition and IPO initial return have a long-run relationship with IPO volume. The 
impact of the governmental policy to require all listed companies to allocate 30% of 
total issued shares to the bumiputera (indigenous population) in 1976 was studied by 
Prasad et al. (2006) and he concluded that IPO was more underpriced after the 
implementation of policy.  
 
The study is fixed at Malaysia as (1) Malaysia has the largest IPO underpricing in 
emerging market; (2) The mandatory public share allocation to bumiputera 
(indigenous population) for listing companies has made Malaysia‟s regulatory 
framework unique from other markets; (3) Share market of Malaysia is growing 
rapidly and has been promoted to FTSE Advanced Emerging Market with market 
capitalisation just below Taiwan in Asia Pacific region, thus making it an interesting 
emerging stock market to study.  
 
The initial return of IPO is traditionally being calculated by the difference between the 
issuance price set by the underwriter and the first day closing price after it went public. 
This method (referred as IPOU in this paper) was widely employed by previous 
researchers on Malaysia market such as Yatim (2011), Hussin (2005) and Embi (2012). 
However, it merely tells the price difference without acknowledging the fact that the 
price fluctuations of the IPO may also be the result of the market movements. For 
instance, the IPO price on the first trading day may increase because investors are 
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confident with the market instead of the IPO itself. Thus, I have introduced the 
market-adjusted initial return of IPO (referred as MIPOU in this paper) to correct the 
price difference with market movements. It is calculated by the difference between the 
IPOU (in percentage) and the movements of Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) 
between the issuance date and the listing day of the IPO. The employment of such 
method is motivated by Su & Brookfield (2013) and Alanazi & Al-Zoubi (2015). As 
MIPOU has never been used in the Malaysian context during my sample study, this 
paper will compare the determinants of IPOU and MIPOU from 2000 to 2015 with 4 
explanatory variables, namely choice of underwriter, offer size, company‟s age and 
hot market condition.  
 
As abovementioned, the regulatory framework of Malaysia is unique because all 
Malaysian-based IPO companies are required to offer at least 30% of its total issued 
shares to bumiputera (indigenous population). This policy, which originated in 1976, 
was introduced to help the bumiputera, who was less wealthy to participate in the 
equity market and earn when the stock price increases. In other words, it means that 
the participation from the wealthy non-bumpitera is reduced and they could only 
purchase the IPO stock during the trading day. Thus, as there are more buyers creating 
more demand for the IPO on the trading day, the IPO price on the first trading day 
will increase more (or underprice more). This theory is line with Prasad et al. (2006) 
who studied about the effect of the pre-implementation and post-implementation of 
this policy. However, as the economic gap between the bumiputera and 
non-bumiputera is smaller, the mandatory bumiputera share requirement was reduced 
from 30% to 12.5% in July 2009. Furthermore, Multimedia Supercorridor companies, 
BioTech companies with BioNexus status and their subsidiaries and those with most 
of their business overseas, or with 51% or more bumiputera interest already, are 
exempted from these equity conditions. This indicates that more participation from 
non-bumputera in the IPO subscription is possible now. Therefore, this policy 
liberalisation is expected to create lesser degree of the IPO initial return than before. 
As this effect of the policy implementation has not been studied before, my research 
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would contribute to the existing literature.  
    
1.1.2 Malaysia Stock Market 
In Malaysia, firms can go public by seeking to be listed on Main Market and ACE 
Market of Bursa Malaysia (previously known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 
KLSE). Main market caters for established companies with clear listing requirements 
such as market capitalisation of at least RM500 million upon listing, uninterrupted 
profit after tax of three to five financial years with aggregate of at least RM20 million 
and a profit after tax of at least RM6 million for the most recent full financial year. 
ACE Market on the other hand, is designed to facilitate early access for capital raising 
for emerging companies. As oppose to Main Market, there is no minimum operating 
track record or profit requirement for companies to go on ACE Market. However, a 
sponsor is needed to act as an adviser and guide the company to ensure that the 
compliance on an on-going basis with requirements, legislation and guidelines issued 
by regulatory authorities are met.  
  
 The IPOs are offered in two broad classes: private placement is offered to 
institutional investors while the non-private placement which consists of public issue 
and offer for sale is offered to individual or retail investors.  
 
The equity market development in Malaysia has been growing rapidly in recent years. 
Pan et al. (2007) stated that the equity market development of Malaysia as measured 
by its market capitalisation to GDP ratio was 110.4% in 1990 and 127% in 2000. A 
working paper published by IMF in 2008 found that the market capitalisation of 
Malaysia is 170% of its GDP, making it highest at stock market development among 
emerging markets such as South Africa, Chile, Jordan and Thailand. Malaysia has 
been promoted to the FTSE Advanced Emerging Market in 2010 by the Global index 
provider FTSE Group together with Taiwan and Thailand in Asia Pacific region. The 
group reported the market capitalisation of Malaysia on 31 December to be USD 
459,004 million, which is second after Taiwan in the same region.  
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The listing process timeline from IPO Structuring and Submission, Application 
processing, Prospectus Registration, Prospectus Launching to Listing takes T+28 
weeks as indicated in Bursa Malaysia‟s Listing Guideline. However, the timeline may 
be extended depending on the complexity and the size of the IPO. Being the capital 
market regulator of Malaysia, Security Commission (Suruhanjaya Sekuriti) is in 
charge to review the applicants‟ IPO proposal and prospectus registration by ensuring 
Equity Guideline (directors and substantial shareholders are free from adverse records) 
and Prospectus Guideline – Equity and Debt (adequate disclosure of financial 
information) are complied. Main market applicants are subject to be reviewed under 
the 2 guidelines mentioned, while ACE market is only subject to Prospectus guideline 
review.  
 
Unlike in U.S where the book-building mechanism is practised, Malaysia practises 
fixed-price mechanism. This means that the underwriter will fix the IPO price 10 to 
15 days prior to the listing date with no changes allowed. Besides, IPOs in Malaysia 
adopted the UK fair allocation policy where all applications are allocated randomly 
and equally. No withdrawal option is allowed once allotment decision is publicized 
(Rahim et. al., 2012). As book building is not allowed, the offer price and the number 
of shares issued must be clearly stated in the prospectus and cannot be changed during 
the issuing process. Since the time between the submission of the prospectus and the 
issue can be a couple of months, the risk of mispricing the new issue is thus 
considerable (Jelic et. al., 2001). 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
Several explanations for the IPO underpricing phenomenon were explored as below:  
 
(i) Asymmetric Information Model 
The initial explanation to this phenomenon was asymmetric information models of 
underpricing where one of the transaction parties – Underwriters, Issuing firm and 
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Investors know more than the others about the true share value. Rock‟s (1982) 
winner‟s curse model assumed that the true value of the shares is better informed by 
certain investors, as compared to other investors and underwriters. Thus, informed 
investors would only bid for attractive prices of IPO while uninformed investors 
would bid for all. With that, winner‟s curse will be imposed to uninformed investors 
in which they will receive all the unattractive shares they have bid for and part of the 
attractive shares as the demand of attractive shares are partly crowded out by 
informed investors. As the uninformed investors will receive full allocation of 
overpriced IPOs, the average returns received are negative. This argument was 
countered by Ritter (2003) where the occurrence of winner‟s curse problem is not 
because of large informed institutions crowd out the uninformed individuals in hot 
offerings (where IPOs returns are high), but instead, strong institutional and 
individual demand make it tough to obtain any shares. In countries that favour small 
over large investors such as U.K, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, 
Thailand and Bangladesh, the adverse selection or winner‟s curse problem developed 
by Rock (1986) can be reduced (Chowdhry & Sherman, 1996a). The rationale of such 
is thought to be “fair” because the informed investors tend to place larger orders than 
uninformed investors even when they have equal wealth. Thus, favouring small 
investors increase underwriter‟s expected revenues and reduces underpricing. In 
another paper, Chowdhry and Sherman (1996b) argued that U.K bidding system 
reduced adverse selection problem because investors are required to pay in advance 
for the shares they bid for. Thus, the information about market demand for the issue 
more credible and uninformed investors are benefited. 
 
Asymmetry information in country level is studied by Banerjee et. al. (2011). Two 
types of information asymmetry are identified, namely “insider-outsider” (firm and 
outsider) and “outsider-outsider”. “Outsider-outsider” is measured with stock price 
synchronicity
1
, while “Insider-outsider” is measured by using median value of 
                                                             
1 Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) propose that stock price synchronicity is defined as R-squared from asset pricing 
regressions. Higher R-squared indicates more market-wide information, while lower R-squared reflects more 
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country-level analyst following. With more than 8700 IPOs in 36 countries between 
2000 to 2006, Baneerjee et. al. (2011) concluded that IPO underpricing is higher in 
countries with higher levels of information asymmetry. 
 
(ii) Institutional Explanations 
Different institutions such as regulatory framework can result in different degree of 
IPO underpricing. U.S and UK represent two different sets of IPO framework. The 
book-building system adopted in U.S refers to a process where the underwriter 
attempts to determine the price of IPO based on the demand from institutional 
demand. Underwriter and issuing firm will provide a price range and the issuing size 
of the IPO. Investors may bid for the price within a prescribed period. Finally, 
underwriter sets a final price (cut off price) usually a day before trading day and sells 
to investors. U.K on the other hand, adopted the fixed-price mechanism in which 
underwriter sets the final IPO price after assessing the company‟s financial 
performance and future prospects. This price remains unchanged until the trading date. 
Investors may subscribe for the IPO after the issuing price is fixed until a day before 
trading period and the application will be allocated randomly and equally. 
 
Loughran et al. (1994) has discovered that countries that adopted the fixed-price 
mechanism such as U.K, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand and Malaysia have larger 
underpricing. Chowdhry & Sherman (1996b) explained that there is possibility of 
information leakage when the offer price of IPO is fixed many days before the issue 
closes for bidding by investors. Thus, there are instances where investors would know 
ex ante that the offer price is “too low” and thus, oversubscribed the IPO. Besides, 
there will also be instances when investors realise that the offer price is “too high” 
and the issue fails. Should the failure is costly, the offering will be underpriced to 
reduce the tendency of failure. However, a more recent research, Loughran et. al.. 
(2006) found insignificant difference between the countries that apply the 
book-building and fixed-price mechanisms, which suggests that the regulations in 
                                                                                                                                                                              
firm-specific information.  
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each individual country may lead to underpricing. 
 
In Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, U.A.E and Oman, the IPO underpricing is caused by the unique institutional 
framework whereby the IPOs price is only allowed to freely fluctuate on the listing 
day (first day) and the price is restricted to a 10% increase or decrease thereafter 
(Alanazi and Al-Zoubi, 2015). Thus, speculators are motivated to exploit the free 
fluctuation feature which is not available on the next day which in turn shoots up the 
IPO price.  
 
China‟s stock market has a short history in emerging market characterised by 
inexperienced investors (Song et al., 2014). Many scholars such as Lu and Zhou 
(2011) and Xu et al. (2011) perceived it as semi-strong market efficiency as compared 
to the U.S stock market. Furthermore, many aspects of IPOs are regulated by the 
government and thus evolution of IPO institutional arrangements goes hand in hand 
with the changes of law and regulations. The book-building method was adopted in 
2005, but with “window guidance” in place, the offer price will be low. “Window 
guidance” requires the IPO firm‟s PE Multiple to not exceed 25% of the average PE 
of industry peer. Song et. al. (2014) found that the main reason for extreme high IPO 
initial return is the overvaluation on the first-day closing price. Liu et. al. (2014) 
studies the relation between underpricing and legal environment using the sample of 
IPOs from 1997 to 2009 and found that firms from province with more developed 
legal framework have less underpricing. The strength of legal protection of property 
rights reduces the extent of underpricing.  
 
Prasad et al. (2006) compares the pre and post protectionism regulation by the 
Malaysian government to bumiputera (indigenous population) and found that the IPO 
has larger underpricing during the post policy period suggesting that the government 
regulatory intervention to encourage a well-intentioned public policy also appears to 
be a significant factor in underpricing.  
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(iii) Ownership and Control 
Being listed publicly is a form of the separation of ownership and control. Ownership 
may influence the management‟s incentives for optimal operating and investment 
decision making (Ljungqvist, 2007). For instance, managers tend to refrain from 
allocating large numbers of shares to investors to protect their private benefits. They 
fear that their non-profit maximizing behaviour would receive unwelcome scrutiny 
(Brennan & Franks, 1997). Smaller stakes held by investors may reduce external 
monitoring.  
 
Ownership and control are often associated with the lock-up ratio and lock-up period 
which requires the shareholders of the pre-IPO firm to retain a certain percentage of 
shares or ownership (lock-up ratio) within the lock up period. Realising that the IPO 
shares would be underpriced, the British pre-IPO shareholders sold their shares after 
years to avoid some of the costs of underpricing associated with the IPO (Brennan & 
Franks, 1997). In Malaysia, Husin (2005) reported that IPO underpricing is negatively 
related to owner‟s participation ratio and positively associated with the fraction of 
director‟s shares which is subject to liquidity restrictions. In addition, with 
cross-sectional regression from 2000 to 2012 in Malaysian market, Rashid et al. (2014) 
found that lock-up period is significant in explaining IPO initial return, while lock-up 
ratio is not. 
 
In terms of corporate governance, dual leadership structure and board reputation are 
positively and significantly associated with the extent of IPO underpricing (Yatim, 
2011). It appears that separation of board chairs and CEO positions signals low 
quality of the firm.   
 
(iv) Underwriter‟s reputation 
Underwriter‟s reputation is linked with the IPO underpricing degree. For instance, 
Hoberg (2003) finds that the greater market power an underwriter has, the greater 
underpricing an IPO will be. In Japanese IPO market, Kirkulak and Davis (2005) 
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